Introduction

(The Framework of Analysis and the Issues Addressed)

A major theme of these essays is that most of philosophy in the past 100 years has been like the blind men describing the elephant—each perspective gives a reasonable description of a particular part, but none gives a coherent view of the "elephant." These essays present a very useful way of describing the "elephant" and in doing so they bring some coherence to moral and political philosophy.

The essays present a *framework of analysis* for moral and political philosophy. This four-part framework is based on a multidimensional understanding of human nature. It uses the perspective of the mind or consciousness and ecology, which is the interaction between an organism and its environment. It thus begins with our levels of awareness and relates them to the evolution and development of our mental capacities. The levels of awareness relate to our individual basic primal needs and desires, society, the natural world in which we live and finally our place in that world or metaphysics. The mental capacities that correlate with these levels of awareness are described as appetite, social consciousness, rational thought, and finally an integrative capacity that some might describe as the psyche or the soul. The integrative capacity and metaphysics have to do with orientation, integration, narrative, and meaning and purpose.

This four-part framework, which encompasses the individual, social, natural, and metaphysical perspectives, will be shown to be very useful as a framework of analysis for moral and political philosophy. This pattern will be described as being apparent in the evolutionary development of the brain (MacLean and Eccles) and the similar progressive development of our mental capacities through experience in childhood (Piaget), and the similar development of our moral capacities (Kohlberg). The essays then relate, in turn, these concepts from the life sciences to a similar pattern in folk psychology, the philosophy of Aristotle, Stevenson's categories for analyzing any philosophy, the meta-ethical cate-

gories, the different historical origins and meanings of the concept of equality, the division of powers in United States constitutional democracy, a four-part model for the causes of pain, and the four principles of medical ethics along with other examples. Many of the fashionable positions in the current climate of opinion in both moral and political philosophy will be challenged. The observation is also made that biology will probably become the prevailing paradigm or model of this century. The framework being described provides a methodology that is inclusive enough to bring some "consilience" to the life sciences, the social sciences, and the humanities, as well as some coherence to the categories of moral and political philosophy.

The usefulness of the four-part general framework of analysis is illustrated by applying it to the primary moral assertion of equality in United States constitutional democracy and then to the primary moral assertion of a respect for human life in medical ethics. It is pointed out that equality, and not freedom, is the primary moral value of United States constitutional democracy and that to properly convey the substantive as well as the procedural aspects of this value of equality one has to refer to our government as at least a *constitutional* democracy. The multidimensional aspects of human nature are reflected in our system of government by the division and balance of powers and the separation of religion and opinion from the coercive powers of government. The essays then also use this four-part framework of analysis to describe how the four principles of medical ethics are related to the primary moral assertion of a respect for human life and a multidimensional understanding of human nature. The essays also describe how, from its beginnings with Hippocrates, medicine has incorporated both science and an ethic, nature and nurture, and fact and value. It has been both descriptive and prescriptive. Furthermore, an association is made between the primary moral assertion of equality in constitutional democracy and the primary moral assertion of a respect for human life in medical ethics. They both represent a respect for persons and an

affirmation of human dignity and worth. The essays also describe how medical ethics at least have the capacity to address the need for dialogue and the capacity for accommodation in a pluralistic global community. The essays thus also address some of the pressing issues of our day, including the need for a stable world order.

Perhaps the easiest place to begin to describe this four-part multidimensional framework of analysis, however, is with folk psychology. Folk psychology has been called the "basic descriptive and explanatory conceptual framework with which all of us currently comprehend the behavior and mental life of our fellow humans and ourselves (Churchland 1995, 18–19)." Folk psychology intuitively and through self-reflection understands there to be physical, social, rational and spiritual aspects of human nature. A good example of this four-part description would be to consider what you might decide to do on a weekend morning. One of the tests of a theory should be whether it correlates with our everyday experiences and the way we actually live our lives.

On a weekend morning you probably take care of your morning routine and then have breakfast. To satisfy other physical needs you may decide that you need extra sleep or that you need to exercise because you have been behind a desk all week. You may also feel that you need to spend social time with the family and go to your child's soccer game or a community event. On the other hand you may have work that needs to be done by Monday for your job, the roof may have a hole in it that needs to be fixed before the next rain, or the grass may need to be mowed. You also may feel that you just need some time for thoughtful reflection with reading, a hobby, or attending a religious service. This is all that is meant by saying that human nature is multidimensional. All of these activities are valid and authentic, and they satisfy our physical, social, rational and metaphysical or spiritual needs. Often because of the constraints of time and other factors we have to choose between them, and yet we try to maintain some coherence and integrity in our lives.

This multidimensional understanding of human nature is not a modern or postmodern idea. It is a pre-modern idea. Plato discussed the triune soul. Aristotle described man as an animal, a political animal (meant to live in a *polis* or community), a rational animal, and a contemplative animal that seeks *eudaimonia* (variously translated as well-being, happiness, proper functioning, or meaning and purpose). Greek civilization began with primarily concrete descriptive thought in the time of Homer, progressed to predominately social thought in Athens at the time of Pericles, further developed rational and naturalistic thinking under Pythagoras, Euclid, Thucydides, and Hippocrates, and finally emphasized abstract thought with the classical Greek philosophers. This multidimensional understanding of human nature was related to the different ways that we interact with the world in which we live. It was often referred to as the organic paradigm, particularly when it was applied to social structure. It was eventually discarded after the Middle Ages because it also had been used to justify religious and political hierarchies. Plato had used this model in his writings to justify the rule of a philosopher-king. In the Middle Ages this paradigm, among others, was used to justify political class divisions and the rule of the king and the Pope.

Perhaps the central insight of these essays is that modern medicine uses these same categories, but not necessarily in a hierarchical manner. There is thus a reason to reconsider these categories and this multidimensional understanding of human nature as a framework of analysis for moral and political philosophy. This proves to be very useful as a means of critique and deeper analysis of those philosophies and ideologies that have been based primarily on only one aspect of human nature or have perhaps left out or excluded an aspect of human nature. One often does not have to argue that a particular philosophical position is wrong, but simply that it holds only one part of the "elephant" and that is not inclusive enough. A multidimensional understanding of human nature in the context of ecology often does not lead to certainty, but, on the other hand, it does not consider everything to be subjective, relative, arbitrary, or based only on material utility. The essays thus address not only some of the tragic ideologies of modernism and anti-modernism, but also what at least some consider to be the postmodern dilemma.

These essays of necessity use some philosophical jargon, but they are only affirming what has just been discussed concerning folk psychology and the similar categories used by Aristotle, because the pattern described by this framework of analysis holds across a wide range of scientific and social disciplines concerning human nature. This pattern, which is based on ecology, provides an explanatory link between nature and nurture, and an explanatory link between our inherent capacities and the development of those capacities through experience.

One of the distinguishing features of the history of Chinese science was that it was based primarily on the recognition of pattern. One is always reluctant to use tables and outlines because they seldom do justice to the nuances, variances and exceptions of the subject. They can in this case, however, be useful to help recognize the pattern which I have been discussing as *a useful framework of analysis.* The appendix at the end of this introduction illustrates a four-part framework of analysis that is based on the multiple dimensions of human nature and it should be useful as a summary and outline, as well as an illustration of a common pattern that can be seen across the basic sciences and moral and political philosophy. Some further commentary may be helpful.

A multidimensional understanding of human nature is compatible with the evolutionary development of the brain, which Paul MacLean described as beginning with a "reptilian complex" (concerned with such basic instincts as individual survival, hunger, and sex), progressing to a limbic system which involves emotions and a social capacity other than hierarchy, and then adding a neocortex which gives the capacity for reason (Sagan 1977, 57–83). To this can be added, at least functionally, what Sir John Eccles describes as the neo-neocortex, which involves an enlargement of the prefrontal

cortex that includes the language centers and a capacity for more abstract thought (1989). This type of evolutionary development of the brain seems to be recapitulated or repeated in the mental development of the child through experience as described by Jean Piaget. This development begins with concrete self-interested thought, and then progresses to social, logical, and finally abstract thought (Inhelder and Piaget 1958). Lawrence Kohlberg described our moral development as following in the same pattern as our mental development (1981). Erick Erickson used a similar pattern to describe the predominant stages of the life cycle (1985).

It is this multidimensional understanding of human nature that brings some coherence to moral and political philosophy and the several ethical categories. Leslie Stevenson, in *Seven Theories of Human Nature* (1987), suggested that the best way to understand any philosophy or philosopher is to understand the assumptions being made concerning the nature of man, the nature of society, and the nature of the universe. Ever since the Copernican revolution, however, the last question has been divided into the scientific nature of the universe, which asks the question "How?", and the metaphysical nature of the universe which concerns man's place in the universe and asks the question "Why?" This multidimensional understanding of human nature also gives some coherence to the ethical categories. Deontological ethics (deon meaning duty), which are often metaphysically based, ask what is obligatory, what is right, or what is my duty. This is usually a universal rule-based ethic. Normative ethics, which are often, but not necessarily, rationally based, consequential, and utilitarian, ask what is good. Communitarian ethics ask what is fitting. An ethic that begins with the concerns of the individual (an egotistical ethic) is now interpreted primarily in terms of human rights, basic needs, and what is humane.

The usefulness of this four part general framework of analysis, which is described as a modern ecological organic paradigm (model), is illustrated by applying it first in a political context to the primary moral assertion of equality and the

foundations of United States constitutional democracy. It is then used to analyze the moral assertion of a respect for life and the applied moral philosophy of medical ethics. In philosophical jargon, the framework of analysis would be a meta-ethical explanatory theory and the primary moral assertions of equality and a respect for human life would give the framework normative, substantive, and procedural content.

In *The Moral Foundations of United States Constitutional Democracy: an Analytical and Historical Inquiry into the Primary Moral Concept of Equality* this four-part framework of analysis is used to describe the several origins of the concept of equality in Western civilization. The concept of equality has its historical origins in different moral and legal systems each of which was focused on a different aspect of human nature and the world in which we live, and each of which, therefore, had a different primary source of moral authority. Canon Law is based on a religious or *metaphysical* source of authority and it contains universal ethical principles of equality based on a reverence for God and reciprocity towards one's fellow humanity. Roman Law, on the other hand, incorporated significant aspects of *natural law* based on a perceived natural moral order in the universe, which everyone could understand with right reason. It contains concepts of equality based on reason and reversibility. English Common Law has a *communitarian* origin which bases concepts of equality on one's rights and responsibilities in society. Finally, there is an *individual* origin of concepts of equality in social contract theory, which is the basis of constitutional law. Social contract theory begins with the individual equal and free in a state of nature and concerned with human rights and the right to resist tyranny. United States constitutional democracy incorporates each of these concepts of equality and different aspects of human nature with a division of government into legislative, judicial and executive branches and the separation of religion and the expression of opinion from the coercive powers of government.

The essays contend that equality was the primary moral concept on which American constitutional democracy was

founded. The Constitution incorporates substantive concepts of equality and the democratic principle incorporates a procedural concept of equality. One can thus not understand or convey the moral foundations of our government without describing it as at least a *constitutional* democracy.

In *What Medical Ethics Has to Offer the Larger Fields of Moral and Political Philosophy* this four-part framework of analysis is then also applied to the four principles of medical ethics. The four principles of beneficence, nonmaleficence, justice, and autonomy are described as being based on a moral assertion of a respect for human life, and the multiple dimensions of human life. Furthermore, an association is made between the primary moral assertion of equality in the political realm and the primary moral assertion of a respect for human life in the realm of medical ethics. They both represent a respect for persons and an affirmation of our common human dignity and worth. That is, the pattern which is illustrated provides an explanatory link between an applied moral theory, such as medical ethics, which is based on a respect for human life, and that portion of the western liberal political tradition, which is based on the concept of equality. Furthermore, the moral assertion of a respect for human life in medical ethics is based on both the biological sciences and historical cultural sources, on both nature and nurture. Medical ethics approaches what Edward O. Wilson has called "consilience" between the biological sciences and the humanities and "reflective equilibrium," which in these essays is described as a balance of consciousness.

Medical ethics can provide a well-balanced source of affirmation, accommodation, moderation, coherence, and synthesis in a pluralistic world. They are one source of an applied moral philosophy that can provide cross-cultural understanding and enable ethical dialogue. Medical ethics have a lot to offer the larger fields of moral and political philosophy at this particular time in history, in part, because they have the capacity to accommodate pluralism in a global community.

The moral assertions of a respect for human life and universal equality, *which are both an affirmation of human dignity and worth,* may be necessary for our collective survival and well-being in a pluralistic global community in a nuclear age. From a perspective based on ecology and co-evolution, the essays describe this affirmation as having individual, social, natural and metaphysical origins. A respect for human life and the concept of equality are both a self-affirmation and an affirmation of our common humanity. These essays help to explain why such an affirmation would appropriately include our basic needs, our social capacity, our capacity for reason and our capacity for interpretation and integration, whether understood as our psyche or soul. ***A naturalized epistemology would include each of these ways of knowing, including metaphysical considerations***.

The essays challenge some of the prevailing ideas of the past 100 years.

The essays propose a four-part *framework of analysis* based on the interactions of ecology and a multidimensional understanding of human nature and the world in which we live. This framework is not meant to be exclusive, but it is felt to be very useful, both as a tool of analysis and a way of bringing some coherence to moral and political philosophy. The essays, however, challenge some of the prevailing academic assumptions and perspectives. Some of these challenges to prevailing ideas have already been proposed in the natural sciences, evolutionary theory, and philosophy, but they have not yet penetrated into the general academic environment or they are so new that they have not been fully vetted. Other challenges to the current climate of opinion are based on a new appreciation of parts of Aristotle's philosophy or some of the ideas of the Founding Fathers of United States constitutional democracy. The categories which are being proposed *as a framework of analysis* are also compatible with folk psychology or the way we generally live our lives. Therefore, if such ideas eventually lead to a change in the climate of opinion and even a change in the prevailing paradigm, they will probably in retrospect be

considered to have always been obvious or even trivial. At this time, however, they are not. At this time we live following a century which coined the word genocide and which will also be identified with individual alienation—a time in which philosophy has been defined as "a discipline in crisis" and, perhaps not coincidently, a time in which we are also still striving for a stable world order.

1. The nature versus nurture controversy

The nature/nurture debate about human nature is a *both/and* rather than an *either/or* issue. This perspective is implicit in the broad concept of ecology as the interaction between an organism and its environment. The current form of this age old debate goes back to Darwin and Marx. It was exacerbated by the tragedies that resulted from both the eugenics and Social Darwinism of German fascism under Hitler and the social engineering and totalitarianism of the Marxist communist state under Stalin and Mao. More recently, the nature/nurture debate became a heated topic with the publication of *Sociobiology* in 1975 by Edward O. Wilson and the opposition to this book from a Marxist perspective by Steven Jay Gould and Richard Letowin. This all originated within the life science departments at Harvard University and the resulting general debate has not been a collegial one. It has been a major source of divisions within the life science communities and between the two cultures of the sciences and the humanities. Times and perspectives change, however, although sometimes slowly.

Evolutionary concepts have recently included a greater consideration of cooperation, altruism, "inclusive fitness," group and multilevel selection, and cultural evolution or co-evolution. Game theory (such as the The Prisoners Dilemma), concepts from computers and artificial intelligence (such as hardware and software, networking, parallel processing, and feedback), chaos and complexity theories (with such concepts as "convergence" and "synergy,"), and our changing perceptions in theoretical physics and astronomy (which should

keep us very humble) have also been changing our perspectives. As a result of the genome project, the sometimes multiple expressions of a "gene" are now beginning to be better understood in relation to other portions of the DNA code, the time and location of expression, chemical gradients, and other complex interactions and feedback mechanisms related to experience. On the other hand, our perceptions and experiences are now being perceived as more deeply related to our psychological orientations, the hormones and neurotransmitters of our physiology, and many subconscious and preconscious processes. Our mind is not a blank slate or a *tabla rasa* as explained by Steven Pinker in his recent work *The Blank Slate: the Modern Denial of Human Nature* (2003). The accumulating evidence for the interrelated combined effects of both nature and nurture is also made by Matt Ridley in his recent work *Nature via Nurture: Genes, Experience, and What Makes Us Human* (2003).

An article by Claudia Wallis in *Time* (May 10, 2004 pp. 56–65) on "What Makes Teens Tick," describes some of the progressive development of the brain as currently understood by neuroscience. The article supports the interaction of nature and nurture. Humans actually achieve their maximum brain cell density in utero at about the sixth month of gestation, with a dramatic pruning of unnecessary brain cells in the final months before birth. By the time the child is six the brain is 90% to 95% of its adult size. The second wave of proliferation and pruning then occurs, which may affect some of the higher mental functions only in the late teens. Between the ages of 6 and 12 the neurons develop more branch-like dendrites and make dozens of connections. The brain then develops more white matter composed of myelin sheaths that encase the axons and make the nerve signals faster and more efficient. The pruning, branching associations, and sheaths to improve transmission appear to be guided by genetics, but influenced by a use-it-or-lose-it principle related to experience and environment. Practicing the piano quickly thickens neurons in the brain regions that control the fingers. Teenagers are subjected

to a flood of hormones that particularly effect the emotions at a time when the prefrontal cortex, the part of the brain responsible for much of our rational judgment, is still maturing. Dr. Jay Giedd, who has been studying teenagers with brain imaging at the National Institutes of Mental Health, estimated that the brain is truly mature at about 25, the age at which you can rent a car. He is quoted as saying that "Avis must have some sophisticated neuroscientists." Our developed brains have several billions of neurons and at least 10 trillion synapses formed among those neurons.

The collection of essays in this book contends that nature and nurture are interactive and interrelated in the human condition. They resonate, in part, because the development of our mental and moral capacities through experience recapitulate or follow a similar pattern as the progressive evolutionary development of the functional capacities of our brain. The essays also contend that evolutionary theory needs to expand to include concepts of cultural evolution and, on the other hand, the totally cultural and behavioral concepts, such as historicism, need to extend "history" back into evolutionary time. We can, to some degree, transcend our natural environment and yet there are also natural constraints on our individual and social will. **Both nature and nurture are important in moral theory for they place limitations on each other.**

2. The facts versus values controversy

The nature/nurture debate has its roots in a more fundamental issue about facts and values. David Hume, a skeptic and a philosopher of the Scottish Enlightenment, wrote in *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1739), "In every system of morality. . . . I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, *is,* and *is not,* I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an *ought* or an *ought not.* This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this *ought,* or *ought not* expresses some new affirmation, 'tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd and at the same time that a reason shou'd be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. . . . this small attention wou'd subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason (469–70)." The doctrine that one cannot infer an 'ought" from an "is" became known as Hume's Law.

The distinction of facts and values was further promoted at the beginning of the twentieth century by the philosopher G. E. Moore, who described the attempt to justify such normative valuation terms as "good" with empirical facts or scientific findings as "the naturalistic fallacy." The doctrine that there is a dichotomy or no relation between facts and values became a mantra of academics, particularly those of a Marxist persuasion, for the rest of the century.

In the quotation above, Hume wrote that "this *ought* or *ought not* expresses some new affirmation." In the previous century, Rene Descartes, a French mathematician and philosopher, had found this affirmation in the famous phrase *"Cogito ergo sum"* or "I think; therefore I am." Beginning from a position of radical skepticism, Descartes could doubt everything except his own thought as an affirmation of his being. He used this as his first principle of philosophy and from this he developed a philosophical system of rationalism based on deductive thought and reasoning. Hume, on the other hand, was essentially a noncognitivist and he based this affirmation and his moral theory on sentiments, passions, and perceptions of pain and pleasure rather than reason. He wrote that "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions . . . (1739, 415)"

An important contemporary critic of David Hume was Thomas Reid (1710–1796) who wrote *An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense* (1764). Reid emphasized the constitution of man as the foundation of our first principles. He offered a naturalistic "common sense" psychology in which the creatures of nature, including human beings, are fitted out by the "mint of nature" with what is needed for survival, social actions, and a valid knowledge of

the external world. This could be theistic or non-theistic, but for Reid, a minister in the Church of Scotland, it was ultimately due to a providential God.

Reid challenged Hume's position that we only know the world through perception mediated by our sense organs, that the constant conjunction or association of two things alone is the grounding of our belief in causation, and that morality is based only on the sentiments, passions, and emotions, as well as pleasure and pain. Reid, in some ways anticipating non-Euclidean geometry, demonstrated that the image of a right triangle when projected on the spherical retina of the eye is itself curved, yet we do not see a curved triangle, but the triangle as it is actually configured. We see what is really there and not just its impression on our senses. We are agents with active powers to achieve success within the natural order of things and this also accounts for what we bring to our concepts of causation. Reid's doctrine of common sense, which in the context of the present essays would be something similar to "folk psychology," was an attempt to combine elements of the school of reason (cognitivism) and the school of sentiment (non-cognitivism) in the area of morals. Recently in "The Neural Correlates of Moral Sensitivity," in the *The Journal of Neuroscience* (April 1, 2002, pp. 2730–2736), Jorge Moll and his colleagues used functional magnetic resonance imaging to demonstrate that moral behaviors are driven by both the emotional and the rational parts of the brain.

A more recent critique is in *The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy* (2002), by Hilaray Putnam, a widely respected Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at Harvard. Professor Putnam grants that it is occasionally important and useful to distinguish between factual claims and value judgments, but that the distinction becomes harmful when identified with a dichotomy between objective facts and subjective values. He takes a pragmatist position that a knowledge of facts presupposes a knowledge of values. He describes evaluation and description as interwoven and interdependent and he argues from a philosophical perspective that there is an entanglement of facts and values.

The current essays recognize that the respect for human life in medical ethics and the concept of equality and our common humanity in the Western liberal political tradition are affirmations and moral assertions, and that they have individual, social, natural and metaphysical origins. In this context of understanding human nature as being multidimensional, the relationship between facts and values is restated as **our perception of the facts is not the sole determinant of our values.**

3. "Depth" and "breadth" in moral philosophy and other distinctions in moral language.

In his 1871 book *The Descent of Man* Charles Darwin wrote: "The following proposition seems to me in a high degree probable—namely, that any animal whatever, endowed with well marked social instincts, the parental and filial affections being here included, would inevitably acquire a moral sense or conscience, as soon as its intellectual powers had become as well, or nearly as well developed, as in man (1:71–72)." Darwin also proposed group selection noting that, "advancement in the standard of morality will certainly give an immense advantage to one tribe over another. There can be no doubt that a tribe including many members who, from possessing in a high degree the spirit of patriotism, fidelity, obedience, courage and sympathy, were always ready to aid one another, and to sacrifice themselves for the common good, would be victorious over most other tribes; and this would be natural selection (1:166)." Darwin also recognized the cognitive fluidity of our multidimensional minds. He wrote of the evolution of a moral sense which he described as "a highly complex sentiment, having its first origin in the social instinct, largely guided by the approbation of our fellow-men, ruled by reason, self-interest, and in later times by deep religious feelings, confirmed by instruction and habit, all combined, constitute our moral sense and conscience (1:165–166)." Recently, brain scans have been used to show that people derive satisfaction from punishing norm violations even at a cost to themselves, as evidenced

by the activation of reward related brain circuits (Quervain, Dominique J.-F. de, et al., "Neurology of Altruistic Punishment" in *Science,* Aug. 27, 2004, pp. 1254–1258).

A few observations and distinctions are important, however, concerning moral theory and dialogue.

First, **it is important to recognize both *"depth"* and *"breadth"* in moral considerations.** Much of our discourse could be clarified by recognizing both "depth" and "breadth" in moral philosophy. There are, for example, two great moral traditions in Western civilization. The first is from classical civilization and is based primarily on a distinction of values regarding such things as truth, goodness and beauty and such qualities as virtue. The second concerns the equal dignity and worth of individuals as persons and is derived primarily from Judeo-Christian sources, such as the Golden Rule and *imago Dei* and later Kant's categorical imperative. The concept of moral "depth," refers to an affirmation of life and *a distinction of values that relates primarily to attributes and behavior.* The concepts of moral "breadth" extends this affirmation to the individual, the social community, our common humanity, concerns about the natural world in which we live, and metaphysical concepts of meaning and purpose. For a moral system to have sufficient "breadth," for example, there needs to be *a respect for persons* and *an affirmation of our common humanity.* The two ethical systems are often confused in dialogue when there is no recognition of the difference between an *equality of persons* and *a distinction of values that relates to attributes and behavior.* There also can be "moral" positions that are "narrow" and "shallow."

Second, relating to the previous discussion about nature and nurture, **morality entails both survival and well-being—both posterity and prosperity.** As a result of sexual reproduction, the human body is made up of both genetic cells and somatic cells. The genetic cells at least have the possibility of reproduction and continuity—the somatic cells in natural circumstances do not. What about us somatic cells? The somatic cells are concerned also about the quality of life.

Moral philosophy is thus concerned about both posterity and prosperity, about Darwinian survival and reproduction and also our individual and cultural well-being.

Third, **there is an expanding circle of our moral and political environment.** From the long-term perspective of anthropology, most of the societies in history have been kinship-dissent groups. Max Weber, an early twentieth century sociologist, coined the term "charismatic" to describe larger societies organized around a religious, political or military figure or movement. He also described a more recent and complex organization of society which he designated as legally based societies. We now, however, increasingly live in a pluralistic global community.

Fourth, **there is a distinction between negative and positive freedoms.** Negative freedoms are freedoms from the intervention of coercive power, such as most of those freedoms in the Bill of Rights. We seek freedom from the arbitrary will of others whether in the form of organized coercion or anarchy. Negative freedoms result primarily from voluntary or contractual inhibitions on our individual and social behavior. In peaceful times these do not usually cost us significant individual resources. They relate primarily to moral and political issues about what restraints we owe to each other as part of our common humanity. Positive freedoms are enabling freedoms, such as education, medical care, Social Security, and issues of the general welfare. They make claims upon other people. Positive freedoms are often achieved at the family and kinship level and they can also be based in voluntary associations, the trades and professions, social norms, religious institutions and philanthropies. Positive freedoms, however, often require a redistribution of resources that is accomplished with public programs, taxes and subsidies, and thus they are usually legislated or directed by a political process. We need both negative and positive freedoms for our survival and well-being.

Finally, if human nature is multidimensional, then there may sometimes be conflicting goals and desires, particularly in a pluralistic multicultural society. Therefore, **there**

needs to be a generally accepted procedure for resolving disputed and conflicting values, issues and claims. In our legal system, for example, we use the procedure of a jury of fellow citizens to evaluate the evidence and facts in a case. At the top of our legal system we have a Supreme Court of nine justices to interpret the law and adjudicate conflicts in law and procedure.

4. A respect for human life is the unifying moral concept of the four principles of biomedical ethics.

Thomas Beauchamp and James Childress developed and taught the four principles of biomedical ethics of beneficence, nonmaleficence, justice and autonomy in their successive editions of the book *Principles of Biomedical Ethics.* They consider the four principles to be derived from the common morality (or all those who are serious about moral conduct and their moral responsibilities) and the historical moral traditions of medicine. They specifically state, however, that "in this 'theory,' there is no single unifying principle or concept—a traditional goal of ethical theory that seems now to be fading fast (2000, 405)." It should be noted, however, that neither Beauchamp nor Childress is a physician. More importantly, the moral assertion of a respect for human life can accommodate and be the basis for each of their described principles when human life and the world in which we live are understood to be multidimensional. Intuitionism is the view that there is a plurality of moral principles, each of which we can know directly. Beauchamp and Childress relied extensively on the intuitionist account of prima facie values by W.D. Ross in *The Right and the Good* (1930). Robert Audi is Professor of Philosophy and Professor of Business Ethics at the University of Notre Dame and Editor in Chief of *The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy.* In a recent work, *The Good and the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value* (2004), Professor Audi also relies extensively on the work of W. D. Ross and concludes that, "In the practical domain, as in theoretical ethics, respect for persons is the fundamental attitude appropriate to the dignity of persons, and the dignity of persons is the central higher-order pervasive value that encompasses the other values essential in grounding moral obligation (201)."

The essays in *Moral and Political Philosophy* consider a respect for human life to be the underlying moral assertion of the four principles of medical ethics. This moral assertion can be supported from the perspective of metaphysics, nature, society and the individual. In turn, a multidimensional understanding of human nature can be inclusive and supportive of our physical, social, mental, and psychic or spiritual needs. It is this multidimensional understanding of human nature and our interaction with the world in which we live that gives some coherence to the several ethical categories. The moral assertions of a respect for human life in medical ethics and equality in political philosophy are both an affirmation of our individual selves and the dignity and worth of our common humanity. It is in this context that medical ethics have the capacity to enable dialogue and accommodate pluralism in a global community. It is in this context that medical ethics have a lot to offer moral and political philosophy.

5. Our government is a constitutional democracy.

At the time of a clash of civilizations it is not unusual for both sides to re-examine, define, and even sometimes codify their basic values and cultural institutions in order to both preserve and convey their basic values and traditions. At the time of the fall of communism in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe, the United States did this poorly. It appears that we are making a similar mistake in our war against terrorism, which is very much a battle of ideas and ideologies and will have to be understood as such for any chance of a long-term resolution and reconciliation. **We are missing a defining opportunity in the history of the moral and political philosophy of the liberal tradition; first, by not defining our primary moral value as equality, understood as a respect for human life; and second, by not defining our government as a constitutional democracy, which is the only way to convey**

both the substantive and the procedural concepts of equality that it incorporates.

At the time of the fall of communism, however, the media, the academics, and our government almost universally described the United States as a *capitalistic* democracy. This was in part because we allowed the Soviet Union to describe their communism to be primarily an economic system rather than a totalitarian political system, which denied any concept of moral or political equality. The primary alternative to communism should have been *constitutional* democracy. The emphasis on capitalism, even for those countries without a legal or institutional substructure to support capitalism, was for the most part at least a short-term disaster. We can recognize today that we have paid a price in terms of our credibility in third world countries by defining ourselves at that time in a primary way as a capitalistic economic system rather than a constitutional democracy. Even in our own country, for example, the degree to which we are a social welfare state or a regulated capitalism is determined by a political process. Our political culture determines our economic policies. The same can ironically be said of the former Soviet Marxist state, which did not wither away, but collapsed of its own weight without the arbitrary use of coercive power to support it.

It is the constitutional aspects of our government, such as the Bill of Rights, that incorporate our substantive concepts of equality. The constitutional principles are placed beyond the majority rule of the legislative process. It is the democratic aspects of our government that incorporate the procedural aspects of equality, such as "one person, one vote."

6. The primary moral value of United States constitutional democracy is equality.

Jefferson, Madison, Tocqueville, and Lincoln all considered equality to be the primary moral principle of constitutional democracy. Yet again, in the current war on terrorism, which began on September 11, 2001, I cannot recall one instance of even a mention of equality. The terrorist attack of 9/11 was an attack on our freedom and security and it is perhaps understandable that our values have subsequently been described primarily in those terms. The Declaration of Independence, however, was written in the manner of Euclidean geometry. Its first premise was that "all men are created equal" and that put everything that followed, including life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, in a moral context. Even the great reformers, such as the women suffragettes and the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., did not repudiate these principles, but urged us to live up to them and place them into practice. A singular emphasis on freedom and liberty at this time may be good for rallying the nation, but it should also be understood that we are in a battle of ideas, in part, with a radical version of Islam. Islam, the religion of 1.2 billion people, is based on a submission to the will of God. Much of the liberty that we convey, on the other hand, is seen by others as the license and self-indulgence in our popular culture rather than the political concept of self-government. During the current war on terrorism it may be appropriate that we emphasize freedom, and to win this war we will need the cooperation of many countries that are not constitutional democracies. To win the peace, however, we will need to understand and convey that our primary moral value is universal equality. It is some recognition of our common humanity in a pluralistic world that makes the accommodation of a wide variety of attributes, cultural differences, desires, and beliefs possible without the use of coercion or being the cause of alienation.

Such concepts of equality are perhaps so ingrained in our own culture that we take them for granted and fail to reflect on them, to clarify and delineate their meaning, and to convey to others their significance. On the other hand, the enormous damages done recently in the court of world opinion concerning the issues of prisoner abuse in Iraq and our failure to voluntarily abide by the spirit of the Geneva Conventions would likely have been avoided if we had understood and attempted to convey our primary moral value as

equality, understood as an affirmation of the dignity and worth of our common humanity. The distortion of our moral compass has been from the top down, beginning with our academic elites.

7. Biology rather than physics will become the primary paradigm

Biology rather than physics will become the primary paradigm of this century. This is in part due to the genome project and the influence it will have on the direction of scientific research. It will also, however, be a result of a much broader understanding of co-evolution and our interaction with the world in which we live. It will be driven by very practical or pragmatic issues concerning life on earth and our need to live in what in many ways is becoming a global community. Biology will not become the new paradigm, however, until it develops a methodology and a multidimensional understanding of human nature that is broad enough to include not only the life sciences, but also the other basic sciences, the social sciences, and the humanities.

Epistemology is the study of ways of knowing and biology is an epistemic process (Rolston 1999, 70). Unlike physics and chemistry which relate to matter and energy, biology also relates to information, which is both genetic and cultural in human biology. In evolutionary biology and in culture the transmission of information is also historical. Life means the presence of intrinsic and functional values. Biological diversity and complexity are based on information about how to compose, maintain, reproduce and transmit life processes. This is the type of self-affirming information that is lost in the reduction of biology to physics and chemistry. In *Nature's Magic: Synergy in Evolution and the Fate of Humankind* (2003), Peter Corning has described the "synergy" to be found in living organisms, which explains in part their adaptive functions in a way that a reduction to physical and chemical elements does not. There are emergent properties, synergies, and functional and cultural values that exist and that are lost in the translation to the basic elements. By natural selection we are not indifferent to our fate and, to a degree, we are also capable of modifying our environment and transcending nature with our human individual and cultural values. It has been noted that life is a countercurrent to entropy and culture may be a countercurrent to natural selection.

In the opening paragraph of his book *Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking* (1907), William James, quoted these words from Chesterton, "There are some people—and I am one of them—who think that the most practical and important thing about a man is still his view of the universe. We think that for a landlady considering a lodger, it is important to know his philosophy. We think that for a general about to fight an enemy, it is important to know the enemy's numbers, but still more important to know the enemy's philosophy. We think the question is not whether the theory of the cosmos effects matters, but whether, in the long run, any thing else effects them." James then stated, in this defining essay on pragmatism, that he thinks with Chesterton in this matter.

There are some very recent changes in perspective which place greater emphasis on ecology as the interaction between an organism and its environment. Holmes Rolston III (1999), has noted that adaptation, a central word in Darwinian theory, is an *ecological* word, not a *genetic* one. Elliot Sober and David Sloan Wilson, the authors of *Unto Others: the Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior* (1998), have been instrumental in the understanding of evolution as a multilevel process. Peter Corning, in his work, writes that evolution can even be understood as a collective survival enterprise. In Darwin's *Cathedral: Evolution, Religion, and the Nature of Society,* (2002) David Sloan Wilson also recognizes both factual and practical realism—a factual realism based on literal correspondence and a practical realism based on behavioral adaptedness. As an evolutionary biologist, Wilson also believes that adaptation and not rationality is the gold standard against which all other forms of thought must be judged and that a well adapted

mind is ultimately an organ of survival. One could surmise also the entanglement of factual realism and practical realism and the importance of our metaphysical capacities for both our survival and our well-being. In moral terms these would include both a Socratic quest and a humanistic commitment, whether they are secular or religious. The Socratic quest, however, can result in an unproductive and pedantic skepticism without a humanistic commitment. A humanistic commitment, whether secular or religious, on the other hand, also needs to remain to some degree open-ended and questioning to avoid the excesses of what Eric Hoffer, after World War II and in a response to fanaticism of all kinds, described as the "true believer."

Why now?

In political philosophy, the international political tragedies of the twentieth century bear witness to the need for universal concepts of equality. It is difficult to imagine an adequate resolution of the global problems which have resulted from technology without a concept of universal equality and a respect for human life and our common humanity. Several writers have noted that our technical progress has far exceeded the parameters of our biological adaptive mechanisms and moral structures. In evolutionary theory this is sometimes referred to as the "nuclear trap." Recently, the two major political powers in the world had a nuclear defense policy of mutual assured destruction, with response time measured in minutes, which some believe could have been fatal for most of life on earth. Power politics as policy thus reaches an undesired absurdity in which it has the potential to be destructive not only of self, but also the foundations of much of life on earth. Among the problems which threaten the future of all peoples are those of nuclear or biological warfare, genetic engineering and population control in a time of scarce resources and a threatened environment, and the level of totalitarianism and terrorism which technology has made possible. Raoul Naroll, in *The Moral Order* (1983), called the

creation of a stable human world order the deepest historical task of our times.

Discord and alienation often result when one of our levels of understanding is emphasized to the exclusion of the others, or when, as a society, we develop ideologies that relate to one of our concepts of metaphysics, nature, society, or the individual, but to the exclusion of the other three. In a pluralistic society there is a potential political problem when any one dimension of human nature is emphasized to the exclusion of the others or when any dimension of human nature is excluded or not taken into consideration.

Singular theories that have based order and moral authority on only material needs, an aspect of social conscience, reason, or a metaphysical/religious concept, or only on the individual, the state, natural science, or an ideology have often led to disintegration and individual and communal tragedy. By focusing on even perhaps a particular truth, in the quest for certainty, they have too easily justified the use of coercive force or been the cause of alienation. The quest for certainty understandably often seeks truth in only one parameter.

It is, important that we be able to understand and convey to the court of world opinion the moral concepts of a respect for human life and equality understood as a respect for persons and the inherent dignity and worth of our common humanity. This is important, for survival, well-being, the enjoyment of individual freedom and the progress of human liberty are not inevitable. They are contingent to a large degree, on our willingness and ability as moral agents to place our free will within ethical constraints. It is indeed the self-imposed ethical or moral foundations of government that change mere obedience to the coercive powers of government into a sense of consensual responsibility for a moral duty, a just order, the common good and human rights. The coercive powers of government are also needed less when those moral values and ethical constraints are incorporated into the culture and our intermediary social institutions, such as voluntary associations, education, law, medicine, economics, science, religion, and philosophy.

The Major Themes

The essays describe a very useful framework of analysis for moral and political philosophy based on ecology and a multidimensional understanding of human nature. This framework brings some coherence to the ethical categories.

The essays describe an explanatory link between nature and nurture, between our inherited capacities and the development of those capacities through experience. They thus provide a basis for "consilience" between the sciences and the humanities.

This framework of analysis and a multidimensional understanding of human nature do not necessarily lead to certainty, but this perspective also does not consider everything to be subjective, relative, arbitrary, or based only on material utility. The essays thus address not only some of the tragic ideologies of modernism and anti-modernism, but also what some have described as the postmodern condition.

The examples of the four principles of medical ethics and four historical concepts of equality in the Western liberal tradition and United States constitutional democracy are used to describe a "balance of consciousness." This "balance of consciousness" may eventually provide a new perspective on pragmatism. It may also lead to a "naturalized epistemology" that includes integrative/metaphysical perspectives and considerations of adaptive realism.

The essays suggest and predict that biology, rather than physics, will probably become the prevailing paradigm of this century. This will also probably not occur, however, until the life sciences develop a methodology and understanding of human nature that is broad enough to also be inclusive of the natural sciences, the social sciences, and the humanities.

A change in perspective requires a challenge to some of the ideas in the currently prevailing climate of opinion. There is an often useful distinction between nature and nurture and also between facts and values, but the essays challenge and reject an absolute separation of such categories and their characterization as dichotomies, for they are often entangled. The essays

point out that moral decisions often include considerations of not only Darwinian survival, but also of well being. They point out that it is important in our dialogue to recognize both "depth" (a distinction of values that relates primarily to attributes and behavior) and "breadth" (which has to do primarily with inclusiveness). The essays note that ecology changes. It is thus also important in our dialogue to recognize the expanding circle of our moral and political environment, as well as a distinction between negative and positive freedoms. There also needs to be a generally accepted procedure for resolving disputed and sometimes conflicting values, issues and claims, a procedure where the means do justice to the ends.

Concerning political philosophy, the essays claim that we are missing a defining opportunity in the history of the Western liberal tradition by not defining our primary moral value as equality, understood as a respect for persons and the dignity and worth of our individual and common humanity, and by not defining, in discourse, our government as a constitutional democracy, which is the only way to understand and convey both the substantive and the procedural concepts of equality that it incorporates.

Concerning the applied moral philosophy of medical ethics, the essays assert that, from the perspective of the physician, a respect for human life is the underlying foundation of the four principles of beneficence, nonmaleficence, justice, and autonomy.

The essays describe the primary moral concept of equality in United States constitutional democracy and the moral assertion of a respect for human life in medical ethics to both be based on a multidimensional understanding of human nature, a respect for persons, and an affirmation of human dignity and worth. It is also noted that medical ethics are one source of an applied moral philosophy that can enable cross-cultural understanding and ethical dialogue. Medical ethics have a lot to offer moral and political philosophy at this particular time in history because they have at least the capacity to provide a well-balanced source of affirmation, accommodation, moderation, coherence, and synthesis in a pluralistic global community.

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An Ecological Organic Paradigm:
A Framework of Analysis for Moral and Political Philosophy

Levels of Awareness	**The Organic Paradigm**	**McLean (triune brain) +Eccles (neo-neocortex)**	**Piaget and Kolhberg**	**Aristotle (Classical Philosophy)**	**Folk Psychology**
Metaphysics	Interpretive Capacity	Neo-Neocortex **(with language centers)**	Abstract Reasoning	Man Seeks *eudaimonia* **(meaning and purpose)**	Spiritual
Nature	Reason	Neocortex	Logical Reasoning	Man is a Rational Animal	Mental
Society	Social Conscience	Limbic System	Social Reasoning	Man is a Political **(social)** Animal	Social
Individual Primal Needs	Appetite	Reptilian Complex	Concrete **(self interested)** Reasoning	Man is an Animal	Physical

Philosophy (Leslie Stevenson)	**Ethics**	**Law**	**Principle of Equality**	**U.S. Constitution (Separation of Powers)**	**Purposes of Government (Preamble of the U.S. Constitution)**
What is the Nature of the Universe? **Metaphysics—why?**	Deontological **(What is obligatory?) (What is my duty?)**	Canon Law	Reverence and Reciprocity	Separation of Church and State **1st amendment**	Secure Freedom
What is the Nature of the Universe? **Natural World—how?**	Normative **(What is good?)**	Roman Law	Reason and Reversibility	Executive Branch	National Security and Domestic Tranquility **(rational order)**
What is the Nature of Society?	Communitarian **(What is fitting?)**	English Common Law	Social Rights and Responsibilities	Judicial Branch	Establish Justice **(social justice)**
What is the Nature of Man?	Egotistical individual human rights **(What is humane?)**	Social Contract Theory	Individual Human Rights and the Right to Resist Tyranny	Legislative Branch	Provide for the General Welfare **(individual needs)**

A current model of pain from the A.M.A.



The ship metaphor for a successful expedition

C.S. Lewis (also from classical philosophy)

1. Each ship must be in order and seaworthy
2. The ships need to be able to sail together as a fleet without running into one another or getting separated or lost
3. There must be the knowledge and skill to successfully navigate to the destination
4. There must be a purpose fulfilled by going to the destination or making the journey

Four Principles of Bioethics

1. **Beneficence —** (reciprocity)
   Do unto others, as you would have them do unto you — The Golden Rule
2. **Nonmaleficence —** (reversibility)
   Don't do unto others, what you would not want them to do unto you — The Silver Rule
   Do no harm
3. **Justice —** (social justice)
4. **Autonomy —** (individual rights)

A graph for analysis of political philosophies or political philosophers